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ARGUMENT
I.

ABANDONMENT WAS NOT TRIED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
WITH EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT.

The issue of abandonment was not tried by either express or implied consent. For
an issue to be ruled on by implied consent, it must be "squarely raised" and "fully aired"
at trial. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 1A\ P.2d 956, 957-58 (Utah 1997). The law
clearly states that "Proof of abandonment of such an easement requires action releasing the
ownership and the right to use with clear and convincing proof of intentional abandonment."
Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765 (Utah 1962). The issues of release of ownership and
right to use were not raised or tried by implied consent.
First, abandonment was not tried by implied or express consent if the Lances never
raised the issue and it was not "squarely raised" or "fully aired" before the trial court.
The burden of proving abandonment belongs to the party asserting it. See Provo River
Water Users Ass'n v. Lambert, 642 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1982). The Lances failed to
meet this burden. They failed to raise, expressly or impliedly, the legal issues of intent to
abandon or actual abandonment and consequently, these issues were not expressly or
impliedly tried before the trial court. As such, Mr. Lunt was prejudiced by the trial
court's ruling on abandonment because he had no opportunity to address intent to
abandon or present evidence against actual abandonment of his easement on the Lane.
The Lances assert that they did not have to amend the pleadings to include
abandonment because abandonment was tried by implied consent. If, as in the Clark
-1-

case, the issue of abandonment had "been squarely raised" and "fully aired" at the trial
such an argument would apply. See Clark 741 P.2d at 957-58. However, the issue of
abandonment was only raised for the first time by Judge Pullan during the Lances closing
argument. R. 959 at 357:21-23. At that time, the Lances admitted that they had not even
looked at the issue of abandonment. R. 959 at 358. This is in essence an admission that
the issue of abandonment was raised for the first time by the Court in closing argument.
As such, abandonment was not squarely raised or fully aired.
Finally, the Lances misapply the burden of proving the issue of abandonment.
They allege without supporting testimony or documentation that "clear evidence of
abandonment was presented, much of it by Cross Appellant Lunt." Reply Brief at 15.
Mr. Lunt had no reason to present evidence of abandonment. Not only is the prescriptive
easement still in use, it would be adverse to his own position of establishing a prescriptive
easement to present evidence of abandonment. Tellingly, the Lances do not cite any
testimony or evidence from the record to show this "clear evidence" of abandonment
allegedly presented by Mr. Lunt.
In short, for the trial court to have found that Mr. Lunt abandoned the easement,
the Lances had to meet the burden of showing by "clear, unequivocal and decisive
evidence" that Mr. Lunt intended to abandon the Lane and actually did abandon use of the
Lane. Tuttle v. Sowadski, 126 P. 959, 965 (Utah 1912). The Lances have failed to meet
this burden. They did not offer evidence at trial and are unable, even now, to muster
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that
intent
1973)

J carried into effect." Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc., 505 P.2d 749, 752 (Kan.
I \. Lunt did not impliedly consent to try the issue of abandonment. As such, the

trial court was incorrect to rule that Mi I i nit abandoned portions of I he Luiie.
.•HE SCOPE O F THE LANE'S USE DURING THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD WAS F O R INGRESS/EGRESS F O R RESIDENTIAL AND
AGRICULTURAL NEEDS, CONSISTENT W I T H THE PRESENT
USE O F THE LANE.
I he historical and prescriptive use of the I ,ane is broad and applies gencrall) lo
residential and agricultural use. Great deference should be granted to the trial court's finding
regarding the u>ct>fik •!, u.-.
. . . , - .

r

ingress/egress. VccOrtnnv Ca^trr 0?0P.2d 1254, 1256 (ITtah
:c m use is

without merit and entirely unsupported by the record. There has been no significant change in
use of the I ane such to constitute an abandoi n nei it oft! le easement b> Mi I \ int, i 101 is the \ ise
limited to agricultural use.
The trial court made clear that the use of the lane was for broad and general ingress/egress
relied on the lane to "access the rear of
their respective acreage" for both residential and agricultural purposes. R. at 729, The coi irt
luiihci toncliiili il ill ii Mi I nun |!iu\ rd Hit M dcniciih 1»\ i leai iind com lining n iiluio

A/.

The trial court based this conclusion on w hat it termed '"particularly credible" testimony from
Elden Carlisle that both parties used the Lane to access their properties from the I *M(>'s lo I he
1950's, R. 958 at 114-127; R. 728. "I estimoiiy from Monaves Boren, Jack Lunt, and Garth Lunt
cited to in the initial brief, as well as in the trial court's decision, clearly and convincingly

supported the conclusion that the Lane was used as a driveway to access both properties for
residential and agricultural purposes. Great deference should be granted to the trial court's
finding regarding the use of the Lane for ingress/egress.
The Lane was historically and is currently used as a driveway to meet residential and
agricultural needs. After trial, the Lances requested that the order describing the easement allow
only "ingress, human and vehicular, ingress and egress and no other use." Hearing Transcript,
Electronically Recorded Feb. 16, 2006, p. 7. The Lances indicated at that time that they were
concerned with potential underground use of the easement for utility easements. They also
requested a ruling from Judge Pullan to define the scope and use of the easement from the bench.
Id. at 8. Judge Pullan acquiesced by refusing to limit the use beyond the memorandum decision
and reasserting the broad nature of the easement, consistent with residential and agricultural use.
Id. at 8, 10. While the Lane was driven on to meet agricultural needs, the main purpose for using
the Lane was and still is for property ingress and egress.
Now, the Lances labor to redefine the trial court's finding that the use of the easement is
consistent with the use of a driveway and meets both residential and agricultural needs. The
Lances argue that the current use of the easement is incompatible with the original use and
therefore extinguishment or abandonment of the easement has occurred. This argument asks this
Court to view the use of the prescriptive easement in a very narrow and unrealistic way.
In addition, the fact that the ingress and egress is not limited solely to agriculture, but
recognizes other uses for a driveway, does not increase the burden on the Lances property. The
Lances continue to claim that the historical use of the lane was for "agricultural purposes" only.
This claim is derived from testimony of the witnesses as they stated that agricultural equipment,
-4-

hay, and animals vveie liansporh'J In (hi" Li> k M lh' prnpnh h usr of (he 1 me. "I his argument
ignores the testimony that ears were parked on the Lane and vehicles have consistently used the
Lane as a driveway to access the McNaughten/Lunt property The argument that agi ici lltural \ lse
i unsliluh's (IK; suh" hislnrii al use of the Lane as "for agricultural purposes" is a very narrow,
subjective, and unworkable interpretation of the facts. Drawing the conclusion that the Lane was
used sole I;, ilni ajpin, iiliiiiiil fiiii poses" coiiipldd) ifnous (in1 puipnsi o( ilir r.isemenf

The

McNaughtens and the Lunts did not need an easement for the agricultural purpose of a place to
move hay, machinery, or drive livestock up and down. Rather, the pi lipose of the easement w as
McNaughtens/Lunts access to the rear of their property via the driveway for
agricultural and residential purposes.
I he I ances ha\ e failed t :> prodi ice ai v • e\ idence to show 1:1 lat the> si iffer an increased
burden property as agricultural use has slowed and residential use iemained consistent. There are
few vehicles that even use the I ,ane and ai i.) bi u den 01 i tl le I ances ft 0111 It lis prescripts e
easement is negligible. The only change to the u ^ uf the Lane has come with the type of vehicle,
new cars rather than farm machinery, and the lack of livestock being run on the Lane. Mr. I imt
ivn. Lunt and those
currently living on the property have shown just the opposite by continually using the Lane for
ingress and egress to the reai of the proper t>
HI.

THE COURT ERRED BY LIMITING THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE
EASEMENT.

"I Itah ca.se law clearlj states that the physical measure and limit of a prescripts e easement
is to be determined by its use during the prescriptive period. See McBride v. Mcliride, 58 i P.2d

-5-

996, 997 (Utah 1978); see also Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). The
witnesses for the Lances estimated the length of the Lane to be anywhere from 150 feet at the
shortest, to approximately 200 feet. All of the Lances' witnesses based their testimony on the
length of the Lane on estimation from their memory of the Lane. None of the Lances' witnesses
testified that they actually measured the Lane.
On the other hand, the witnesses called by Mr. Lunt all testified that the Lane was 235 to
247 feet in length. This testimony was made from actual measurements taken by the parties.
The testimony of Mr. Lunt's witnesses was far more credible than the testimony of the Lances'
witnesses as it was based on actual measurements. The testimony provided by the Lances'
witnesses was based on estimations and memories of buildings long since torn down. (See R.
959 at 264-267; R. 959 at 258). Therefore, the trial court erred when it limited the length of the
easement to 180 feet. The record, and the trial court's findings, clearly support a holding that the
length of the easement was and is at least 235 feet in length. This Court should issue an order
finding that the length of the easement is at least 235 feet.
In regards to the width of the easement, the record reflects testimony that the historical
width was approximately 34 to 35 feet. (See R. 958 at 182 and R. 958 at 135-136). In fact, the
Lances' witness, Mr. Duane Smith testified that the Lane was approximately 40 feet in width. R.
959 at 258). The evidence presented at trial clearly supports a finding that the Lane should be
approximately 34 feet in width. The trial court erred by finding the width of the Lane to be 20
feet and this Court should issue an order finding the easement to be at least 34 feet wide.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Cross-Appellant Garth Lunt requests
this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below in regard to the issue of abandonment and
to issue an order finding the easement to be at least 235 feet in length by 34 feet in width as
supported by the record, and together with all further relief the Court deems just and appropriate
under the circumstances.
DATED this \^\

day of September, 2007.
BOSTWICK & PRICE P.C.

,-%s^ ,

Randy B. Birch
Corey S. Yachman
Attorneys for Appellee and Cross-Appelllant
Mr. Garth Lunt
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-1IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARTH L U N T ,
Plaintiff,
Case N o .

020500612

HAROLD LANCE and DIANA LANCE,
Defendants.
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February 16, 2006

on

B E F O R E : THE H O N O R A B L E DEREK P. PULLAN
Fourth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
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Plaintiff:

For the

Defendant:

Transcribed

Randy Birch
_BIRCH LAW OFFICES
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Heber, UT 84032
T e l e p h o n e : (435)654-4300

Kraig Powell
TESCH LAW OFFICES
PO Box 3390
314 Main S t r e e t , S t e . 201
Park C i t y , UT 84060
T e l e p h o n e : (4 3 5)649-0077

by: Beverly ],owe, CSR/CCT

1909 South W a s h i n g t o n Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 377-2927

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on February 16, 2006)

3

MR. BIRCH:

4

Randy Birch appearing for and behalf of

plaintiff, your Honor.

5

MR. POWELL:

6

Diana Lance.

7

Kraig Powell, your Honor, for Harold and

I apologize.

THE COURT:

We were discussing with Counsel.

The Court decided this case by written

8

memorandum decision several months back, I believe.

9

I reread that decision in preparation for today's hearing.

10

There's an objection to the proposed order that I've

11

Have you been able to work those issues out?

12

MR. BIRCH:

13

things.

I've read --

reviewed.

We haven't, your Honor, and a couple of

We did -- no, none of them, quite honestly.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. BIRCH:

We've talked about two or three of them.

16

The issue we were most recently trying to deal with is they

17

prepared a conflicting survey that says that it's 150 feet from

18

the eastern most corner to this gate, this road or this fence.

19

Mel McCorry measured it and said it was 160.

20

it's 150.

21

furthest east portion.

22

mark or not, but supposedly they're both coming from the gate and

23

going towards the east.

24

adjust it.

25

I

Christensen says

It sounds like they're both trying to go to the

THE COURT:

I don't know whether they're off the same

I don't know -- I don't know how to

Okay.

Well, do we need an evidentiary

-31

hearing on that limited question?

2

don't know how to resolve it if you can't do it yourselves.

3

MR. POWELL:

If it's a factual question I

I hope we can resolve it, and maybe we

4

could -- if necessary, depending on some of the other issues, we

5

could set such a hearing and hopefully we'll be able to resolve

6

it before then.

7
8

THE COURT:
width of the --

9
10

Is there further disagreement about the

MR. BIRCH:

Well, I think my letter, which I copied down

accurately set forth my question about the width.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

12

MR. BIRCH:

I couldn't tell whether it was supposed to

13

be 20 or 34.

I believe there was two provisions that directly

14

confJicted each other, so 1 prepared both and I submitted in the

15

alternative to the Court, so as to hopefully avoid this hearing,

16

but --

17

THE COURT:

Yeah.

18

MR. BIRCH:

The width I don't know.

19

THE COURT:

It was my intent when I issued that decision

20

that the width of the easement was at one period of time the

21

broader width but that it had been abandoned, and what was --

22

what remained was a 20-foot width for purposes of a driveway is

23

essentially what they had used it for from the mid '80's.

24
25

MR. BIRCH:

I didn't see anything in the findings that

talked -- that they ever mentioned that the width was even
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disputed.

Indeed when the Court was out there the fence was

2

still there.

We looked at it.

3

THE COURT:

Yeah.

4

MR. BIRCH:

So that's why I didn't come to that

5

conclusion.

I did understand the abandonment on the land.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. POWELL:

Right.
And your Honor, as I've indicated, our

8

client at this point after considering the matter would certainly

9

be willing to stipulate to the 20 feet because we interpreted the

10

Court's ruling that way also.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, in my -- I had not seen the

12

objection come in and had actually signed the 20-foot easement

13

order that -- in findings and judgment that had been prepared.

14

Yesterday I signed that, and then I realized that there was an

15

objection.

16

would be the 20 feet, and that the balance of the easement had

17

been abandoned.

18

distance between the gate and the property line.

19

that that's just the distance between two points, and I think --

That was my intent from the beginning is that it

I would think that you could work out the
It seems to me

20

MR. BIRCH:

Well, I think clearly --

21

THE COURT:

-- mathematicians would probably tell you --

22

MR. BIRCH:

-- we all agree

23

THE COURT:

-- there's only one distance there, so --

24

MR. BIRCH:

You know, and that's the problem.

25

—

I said,

"Well, as long as you're measuring from the gate towards the

1

road,

I don't care where you stop because we've got the

road."

2

THE C O U R T :

Yeah.

3

MR. B I R C H :

If it goes beyond the eastern boundary,

4

w h a t , but there -- I think we could do this with the

5

and forget the l e g a l , your Honor, because M o o r e ' s

6

say legal description

7

northern, 20 foot.
THE C O U R T :

Yeah.

9

MR. B I R C H :

And

10

approximately

southern,

to

150 feet from 6th W e s t .

THE C O U R T :

Uh-huh.

12

MR. B I R C H :

But approximately

13

THE C O U R T :

From the mid

14

MR. BIRCH:

-- is not adequate

to center of road.

is not

--

-for -- if you want to go

I went out there today and --

16

THE C O U R T :

From the center of the

17

MR. B I R C H :

-- there was about 180 feet

19

THE C O U R T :

Yeah.

20

MR. BIRCH:

Just to represent

18

descriptions

I think we could do that back

11

15

narrative

subject to an easement along the

8

roadway.
from center

of

road.

the C o u r t , okay.

21

personally went out with my measuring

22

for v e r i f i c a t i o n

23

hooked on a metal thing that was in the middle of fence.

24

walked out and at 153 feet there's a telephone

25

so

tape, and I can bring

if you need, and I m e a s u r e d

THE C O U R T :

Uh-huh.

I

from the fence.

pole.

I

it in
I

1

MR. BIRCH:

2

west than another pole, but it's the main telephone pole.

3
4

It's a newer pole that sits actually further

1

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. BTRCH:

At. 1 b b feet

is where

the m a i l b o x e s

5

planted, and at 180 feet is where the center of road --

6

approximate center of road was.

7

here doing this trying to figure center.

were

Now it snowed today, so I'm out

8

THE COURT:

Yeah.

9

MR. BIRCH:

But it was real close to 180 feet.

10

THE COURT:

This isn't the ruler that you measure your

11

fish with, is it?

12

MR. BIRCH:

Nay, your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. POWELL:

All right.

If I could briefly respond to that, your

15

Honor, I think it is important for us to have a legal description

16

because this is exactly the question that's going to come up.

17

The reason it matters, your Honor, is in the broader context of

18

this case, there is a parcel of land back there that the Court

19

ruled that an easement has been abandoned.

20

feet exists, somehow in the future interpretation beyond that

21

gate due to an oversight that we make right now, then that

22

easement will effectively not be abandoned in order to access

23

that rear property.

24

could -- I think it's a Wasatch County monument.

25

question -- we were on the phone right now with Mel McCorry and

If an additional 10

So I would like to get a surveyor and we
The only

-71

Bing Christensen.

2

County monument is somehow in dispute, and I don't think it is.

3

I think we can resolve this pretty quickly, and then we will be

4

able to --

5

The only question is whether that Wasatch

THE COURT:

It seems to me yeah, that you're right, that

6

as long as we're measuring from the gate east that -- my ruling

7

is that that gate is where it ends.

8
9

MR. BIRCH:

And those were the instructions that were

given to the engineer.

10

THE COURT:

Yeah.

So I'm -- if I gave you, I don't

11

know, 30 days to work this out can you do it within that time

12

period?

13

MR. BIRCH:

With regard to that issue, your Honor.

The

14

other concern that I had is in the objection that they raise,

15

they wanted it limited to foot traffic or something.

16

the evidence is pretty clear that over the years there's been

17

equipment and foot traffic and cars parked and whatnot.

18

trying to find their objection right now, but -- yeah.

19

defendants request that the easement say, quote, "Ingress, human

20

and vehicular, ingress and egress and no other use."

21

don't think that's appropriate to limit it to that.

22

easement is an easement, which means neither of them can block

23

it.

24

that I prepared.

25

of the way.

You know,

I'm
The

Well, I
I think an

That's why I added -- I did put that language in the order
Both of them have got to clean their crap out

Both of them need to avoid blocking it, because if

1

it's an easement by definition they both -- she owns it -- the

2

land, arguably.

3

block it by definition.

4

He has a right to use it.

MR. POWELL:

Neither of them can

And your Honor, we weren't concerned.

5

think we'll be able to enforce the blocking issue.

6

concerned more about underground type uses.

7

"surface."

8

instance.

9

I

We're

That's why I wrote

So a utility easement would not be allowed, for

I think during -- if we're going to have 30 days on the

10

other, I think Randy Birch and I can easily come up with

11

agreeable

12

language on this as

THE COURT:

well.

You know, that's -- I think driveways are

13

used for a host of reasons that are incidental to residential

14

use, including for even livestock.

15

purposes.

16

frequently go under driveways.

17

out I'll give you more time to work it out.

18

decision today I can give you a decision today.

19

hate to take away your destiny out of your hands if you feel like

20

you can work something that's going to be a better arrangement

21

for both of you.

22

They can be used for those

It seems to me -- and, you know, utility easements

MR. POWELL:

If you believe you can work it
If you want a
Ultimately I

Although I'd like to know the -- you know,

23

I actually would like to know the Court's opinion on this matter.

24

I guess what your Honor was just indicating was that even if

25

utilities were used there, it once again highlights the
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importance of limiting that to 150 feet.

2

utilities back there and if they could go back 360 feet past

3

the gate they could reach another lot that the Court's decision

4

has now landlocked.

5

and -- which is why we've taken this unusual step of substituting

6

Counsel on, and now at this late date bringing up some of these

7

issues.

8
9

It is a very weighty matter for my client,

I would actually, so that my client knows, I would
actually like a ruling from the Court on that today if --

10
11

If they could take

THE COURT:

Do you need time to respond to the objection

in writing or --

12

MR. BIRCH:

I don't think I do, your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. BIRCH:

I think you directed that we pay for a

15

surveyor to prepare a legal description.

16

a copy of your decision, and the order is as it's been submitted.

17

The 20 foot one I believe accurately reflects the order of the

18

Court.

19

The surveyor was given

I also believe that in this case they say, "Well, Birch

20

didn't win -- or Lunts didn't win because the Court threw out

21

their boundary by acquiescence."

22

any offer of judgment where they made any offer to do anything in

23

this matter of settlement.

24

well, it doesn't matter.

25

by my client which were rejected.

Well, your Honor, I don't see

We -- as a matter of fact, we -There were discussions had, offers made
There were counter offers that
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were rejected.

2

right by Court order to go across that land.

3

Court a breakdown of costs

4

p r o c e s s , witness

5

exhibits

6

costs based on my m e m o r a n d u m

7

prevailing

8
9

I

My point is they own the land.

that includes

that were

related

to that

1 8 , probably b e c a u s e

case

12

party we're e n t i t l e d

13

would ask the Court

14

THE C O U R T :

Okay.

15

MR. B I R C H :

With

We realize

we've addressed

20

that has been

even see it, but

I inadvertently

We're not asking

to reimbursement
to enter judgment

of

and

as

of

the

put the 3 8 - 1 lien

case.

for fees in
As the

this

prevailing

of Court c o s t s , and we
for that

amount.

Where is the -regard to the other i s s u e s , I think

-- reference

to 38 in the proposed
MR. B I R C H :

Your

I believe

MR. P O W E L L :

22

m e m o r a n d u m of c o s t s .

to -- I'm

sorry, where

know, Counsel m e n t i o n e d
it's there because

It's the first line in M r .

Oh, in his m e m o r a n d u m ,

24

MR. B I R C H :

That can be stricken because
Honor.

it.

1 didn't

--

THE C O U R T :

statute, your

is the

order

23

wrong

service

--

21

25

the

for an award

submitted

that that's not an o p t i o n .

THE COURT*

19

fees,

I use this form on a m e c h a n i c ' s

11

reference

given

the

party.

Clearly that's not the c a s e .

18

filing

We would ask

Counsel did point out that

17

I've

fees, and in this case the aerial p h o t o s

10

16

We now have

Birch's

okay.
that

is the
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THE COURT:

I'm looking at the wrong thing

2

MR. BIRCH:

Now did you have any other questions about

3

the boundary description?

4

We've argued about the length.

5

we've addressed all of those questions.

6

questions for me I'd be happy to address it.

You already addressed the width.
Costs and the scope, I think
If you have any other

7

THE COURT:

I don't.

8

MR

Thank you, your Honor

9

THE COURT:

10

I'll hear you last.

11

BIRCH:

MR. POWELL:

Okay

Thank you.

I think it's your objection, Mr

Thank you.

Powell, so

Just not much time here, your

12

Honor.

13

suggested, to work out the boundary issue

14

wanted to enter a provisional ruling today on the language I have

15

proposed about the scope of the easement, I'd be happy to hear

16

that.

17

quite a bit and I'm very surprised that I cannot find Utah case

18

law or an AOR annotation or other annotation on the issue of

19

costs.

20

costs, and the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs,

21

unless the Court otherwise orders

22

I would appreciate a 30-day period, as the Court has
If the Court somehow

Finally, on the costs, your Honor, I've researched this

Rule 54 does allow the Court in its discretion to award

Given that it seems to my client that this case was

23

about a large issue that the plaintiffs did not prevail on and

24

that she has -- the Lances have incurred large costs themselves,

25

we are simply requesting that the Court in its discretion rule
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that both parties shall pay their own costs.

2

balance of my arguments for today.

3

THE COURT:

Thank you.

That would be the

Thank you.

All right.

Initially as to the

4

scope of the easement, it's not my intent to limit its use beyond

5

the memorandum decision that has been issued.

6

question was not really tried on its facts, and in my view a

7

driveway used incidentally to residential use has a host of uses

8

that really would be impossible for me to define.

9

easement.

It's -- that

It's an

It can be used by the property owners for purposes

10

that are consistent with their residential use, and those uses

11

are very broad.

12

relates to limiting the scope of the use of the easement.

13

I'm not inclined to grant the objection as it

As to the issue of its width, I've explained it was my

14

intent that the width of the driveway would be 20 feet.

15

written decision was not clear in that regard, the objection has

16

brought that to the floor, and I intend to approve an easement in

17

that width.

18

If my

As to the issue of the length of the easement, there's

19

no question that measurement should commence from the gate that's

20

referenced in the memorandum decision, and that we should measure

21

east to 600 West.

22

should measure from the center line of 600 West.

23

predictability to future owners.

24

change.

25

corners in Wasatch County and disagreements about which one

For predictability of everyone, I think we
That will give

That point isn't going to

Especially I know that there's been some concern about
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should be measured from, arid so let's measure from the center

2

line of 600 West, whatever that is.

3

can agree that it's 180 feet, we can put that into the order, but

4

it's -- that's what I'm going to order.

5

That's my decision.

If you

As to the issue of costs, Rule 54(b) grants discretion

6

to the Court to award costs to the prevailing party in the case.

7

In my view, Mr. Birch's clients were the prevailing party, and

8

should be awarded costs in the amount that has been sought,

9

$2,332.20.

Do the findings, order and judgment on the 20-foot

10

easement need to be changed in any way based on what I've ordered

11

today?

12

MR. BIRCH:

I believe the only change that I perceive to

13

be need would be that my narrative description will say -- will

14

go 20 feet wide and 180 feet the extent -- running from the gate

15

on the west to the center of 8th -- the center of 6th West Street.

16

THE COURT:

Right.

17

MR. BIRCH:

And so the description will need to be

18

tweaked in that regard.

19

THE COURT:

Will you make that change?

20

MR. BIRCH:

I will have that description prepared.

I

21

will submit it to Counsel for review, and hopefully approval.

22

will incorporate the entire changes so that the order that's been

23

prepared can be torn up or initiated or --

24

THE COURT:

Okay.

25

MR. BIRCH:

Okay.

That's what I needed to know.

I

